ABSTRACT. We assess the determinants of Chinese direct investment in Africa compared with those of global FDI. We find that economic size and macroeconomic stability are positively correlated with Chinese and global FDI in Africa. Institutional variables, such as accountability and rule of law, are not significant in either case and the same can be said about FDI-aid complementarities. The presence of oil is a determinant of Chinese FDI but not of global FDI into Africa. Conversely, the openness of the economy is a determinant for global FDI but not of Chinese FDI, which appears to favour closed economies possibly due to industrial organizational concerns. While these differences accord with intuition, we find no evidence for the claim that Chinese FDI in Africa is related to non-economic governance in a specific way that differs from global practice. More refined governance indicators should be used to verify whether Chinese and global FDI into Africa remain indistinguishable on this score: we plan to do this in future research.
INTRODUCTION
Investing in China's booming economy has been a salient world feature since the mid 1980s. The main reason for the attraction of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) lies with China's pursuit of market-orientated reforms, coupled with a large internal market and low production costs. The fact that China itself began to invest heavily abroad, using the proceeds from its growing trade surplus, from the early 1990s onwards is less recognized.
Nevertheless, the recent surge in Chinese investment, especially in Africa, has drawn considerable attention from policy-makers and academics, who seek to understand whether it is being driven by a possible "China-Africa factor". Indeed, Wang (2007) 1 reports that China has either become a major market, donor, financier, investor or a combination of these roles for many African countries. In general, it is fair to say, that China's current engagement in Africa is primarily trade and investment rather than aid-related and that the private sector's role in it is increasingly more pronounced. As for Chinese investment in Africa, the big surge occurred in 2003 following the implementation of China's strategic "going out" policy. As a result, outflows to Africa increased from under 100 million US$ to more than 500 million US$ during the period 2003 to 2006.
In this paper, we use aggregate data on the drivers of China's FDI into Africa and compare them to those of global FDI into Africa to better understand China's engagement with the continent. Specifically, we consider the role of macroeconomic stability, degree of openness, oil as well as that of the rule of law and accountability. The inclusion of the two latter variables is motivated by many observers' contention that China disregards these important institutions when pursing its investment strategy. Indeed, China explicitly acknowledges that it is not its business to interfere in domestic concerns. As early as 1964, the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai defined the "Eight Principles for China's Aid to Foreign
Countries". One of these, states that "in providing aid to other countries, the Chinese Government strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries". As such, we want to know whether there is empirical evidence for this contention.
Our paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we briefly describe the determinants for FDI based on different categorizations found in the literature. Section 3 discusses our estimation results while section 4 concludes. In the Chinese case, the emergence of large state-owned companies endowed with considerable reserves has allowed for significant investment in Asia, Latin America and Africa. One of the reasons frequently cited regarding China's interest in Africa is its desire to ensure a reliable supply of much-needed commodities, such as crude oil amongst others.
DRIVERS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
This corresponds to an essentially resource-seeking motive. Indeed, Broadman (2007) 8 finds, using UNCTAD data, that crude oil accounts for over 60 percent of African exports to China.
Other items are found to have a much smaller weight in export make-up, e.g. the diamonds that China imports, almost exclusively from South Africa, accounts for around three percent only.
In the next section, we seek to understand what drive's China's FDI in Africa. In doing so, we focus on ''behind-the-border'' conditions in accordance with the typologies presented in Asiedu (2002) and Broadman (2007) . Note that, by design, our study does not address the so-called "Africa factor" that is referred to by Asiedu (2002) . Under this viewpoint, good institutions, more flexible markets and a better prepared working force alone do not explain FDI flows into the African continent, and so geography is also considered to be an important FDI determinant.
ESTIMATION RESULTS
The data have been collected from various sources. Data on Chinese FDI into Africa We recognise that the models used previously to study the driver's of FDI vary considerably depending on the exact research question being addressed, as well as on data availability which is know to be a serious issue for many African countries. Moreover, the accuracy of Chinese data has also been disputed (see Wang, 2007 Investment and Gross Domestic Product; logPop is the logarithm of population; logSurf is the logarithm of surface area; Openness is the degree of openness (measured by the volume of trade divided by GDP); Oil is a dummy variable reflecting the fact that the greatest export from that country is oil (oil1) or that the country is a major exporter of oil to China (oil2);
Institutions is an institutional variable that captures rule of law or accountability; and, Aid is a dummy variable indicating the existence of loan agreements in place, which we use as a proxy for bilateral aid as described by Brautigam (2008) 12 .
Although our model follows Chang and Ma (2007) 13 Tables 2 and 3. [ Tables 1 to 3 
here]
We find that the level of GDP of the host African country is positively related for both
Chinese and global FDI. For China, two other macroeconomic factors appear to be important, namely the inflation rate and the degree of openness. The first factor is probably related to macroeconomic stability concerns, and, perhaps to a lesser extent, real exchange rate considerations. Regarding the second, it is surprising that the degree of openness affects negatively FDI. One could read this result as an indication that local markets matter to China and that it is trying to leap over the border to serve these. Or, that China could simply be investing in countries that are less integrated into the world economy. As for global FDI, it is positively related with the degree of openness, which implies that more integrated African countries attract larger FDI.
The most disparate result is that oil appears to be associated with higher FDI in the case of China whilst having no relation to world FDI. Moreover, if we use the oil2 dummy in our estimations (so as to consider only those countries from which China imports its oil instead of those rich in oil that export to China and elsewhere), this effect becomes even stronger (the estimated coefficient is 1.759). This implies that China is investing in the same countries from where it is importing oil. As for institutions, neither the rule of law nor accountability is related to Chinese FDI. The same is true for global FDI, however. Finally, we find that there no evidence of FDI-aid complementarities either for Chinese or global FDI 15 .
[ Table 4 here]
To ensure a more robust analysis, we also estimate a random effects model, which assumes the existence of an individual effect for each country that is randomly distributed in such a way that it is not correlated with the residuals. We conclude in favour of an unobserved effect through the Breusch-Pagan test, as described in Greene (1997) 16 . In general, our previous findings are confirmed (see Table 4 ), especially with respect to oil. We find that being an oil exporter to China increases Chinese FDI in that country by a factor of approximately two. The remainder of the results tells us a similar story as those obtained using the pooled regressions. period. In spite of the diversity of its 53 countries, Africa is often perceived to be specific as a host for FDI. Similarly China's specific economy and polity are often perceived to impinge on its outward FDI.
In our paper, we use aggregate data on the drivers of China's FDI in Africa and compare them to those of global FDI in Africa in search of a possible "China-Africa factor".
Essentially, we analyse "behind-the-border" variables and see how they affect the volume of FDI in Africa, undertaken either by China or by the world as a whole. We find that this factor comes down to different regression coefficients. The existence of oil is important for China but not so for global FDI. China favours macroeconomic stability, measured by low inflation, as does the world. The degree of openness has a negative effect for China but a positive one for global FDI, which suggests that Hymer's monopolistic motive for investing may be at work. Accountability and rule of law is not important either for Chinese or global FDI and FDI-Aid complementarities are absent in both cases. We plan to use more refined governance indicators to verify our results' robustness in future research, as well as more disaggregated data and a larger sample period.
In answering our question: "Is China specific when it comes to investing in Africa?" we conclude that: yes, it is different, on the one hand, as the existence of oil and a lower degree of openness seem to attract Chinese FDI, possibly due to resource-seeking and industrial organization concerns. On the other hand, it is the same as the world when one considers macroeconomic stability, aid complementarity and institutions. We find no evidence for the claim that Chinese outward FDI brings "no strings attached". From this perspective, global and Chinese FDI are indistinguishable. In the end, China is different, and yet the same, when it comes to the drivers of FDI in Africa. 350 000 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
